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Abstract
In the operations management literature, traditional revenue management focused on pricing
and capacity allocation strategies in a two-period model with stochastic demand. Inspired by
travel and lodging industries, we examine a two-period model in which each seller may also adopt
the overselling strategy to customers whose valuations are differentiated by timing of arrivals.
Widely seen as a popular hedge against consumers’ skipping reservations, we extend the stylized
approaches of Biyalogorsky et al (1999) and Lim (2009) to understand the value of overselling
under various market structures. We find that contrary to existing literature, the impact of
period-two pricing competition from overselling spills over to period-one such that overselling
may not always be a (weakly) dominant strategy once unlimited early demand ceases to hold in
a duopoly regime. We provide some numerical studies on the existence of multiple equilibria at
the capacity allocation level which actually lead to different selling strategies at the equilibrium
despite identical market conditions and firm characteristics.
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1 Introduction
The practice of overbooking is commonly observed in travel and lodging industries where sales
volume typically exceeds the available capacity. In the airline industry, overbooking is predomi-
nantly used as a hedge against passengers who either cancel or do not claim the seats that they
have reserved and by allowing more seats to be booked, the load factor can be improved during
takeoff. Historical data has shown that about 10-15% of passengers do not claim the seats they
reserved (Rothstein 1985, USA Today 1998). In the event that more consumers than expected
show up, overbooking inevitably leads to overselling. The practice of overselling is highly regu-
lated. Since 1976, the U.S Department of Transportation (DOT) has mandated compensations for
involuntary bumping in the form of a free ticket in the future, an upgrade in a subsequent flight,
some travel vouchers or even cash 4. As an officially sanctioned practice of over forty years, the
popularity of deliberate selling beyond the available capacity continues unabated. Furthermore, the
improvement in data collection technology has motivated scores of companies to explore innovative
pricing strategies to maximize revenue in the face of differentiated consumers. While overselling
seemingly provides a “win-win” scenario for the firm and the consumer, its impact on firms’ prof-
itability remains interesting and relevant. With large amount of data available for industry-assist
opportunities, this work explores the value of overbooking (and overselling) where tactical rules
are prescribed for determining the “right” price and the “right” capacity allocation in the face of
demand variability driven by consumers’ erratic behaviors over the selling periods.
Our work straddles within operations research, economics and marketing that deals with man-
aging demand uncertainty (Philips 2005, Talluri and van Ryzin 2004, Bitran and Caldentey 2003,
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003 and Weatherford and Bodily 1992 all provide good overviews in
this area). With our goal to investigate tactical allocation of fixed capacity, this research is closely
related to the area of price-based revenue management. For the monopolist, Wilson (1988) showed
that firms can increase profits by charging two different prices and rationing sales at discount.
Furthermore, Dana (1999) showed that demand uncertainty is sufficient to create price dispersion
when consumers are differentiated by timing preferences. Fedegruen and Heching (1999) and van
4see http://airconsumer.dot.gov/publications/flyrights.htm#overbooking
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Meighem and Dada (1999) in particular, examined the role of inventory in managing pricing com-
petition when there is demand uncertainty. For the monopolist, Shugan and Xie (2000) found
that uncertainty in buyers’ valuation are sufficient to drive profitability for advance selling. Later,
Shugan and Xie (2005) extended advance selling to a competitive framework and they showed
that profitability of both firms increases. It turns out that while discount seeking buyers are tar-
geted parties for advance selling, the additional volume more than compensates for the discount.
However, these models do not consider overbooking.
The seminal work of Rothstein (1971) studied overbooking and derived an algorithm to de-
termine the extent of overbooking while Desiraju and Shugan (1999) investigated overbooking as
part of an yield management system when there are cancellations. Even if consumers do not skip
reservations, Biyalogorsky et al. (1999) showed that overselling with opportunistic cancellation is
always profitable for a monopolist, as long as the late-arriving consumers value the ticket more than
early-arriving ones. With the same model setup, Lim (2009) extended it to a duopoly and showed
that overselling is a weakly dominant strategy although the outcome where both firms oversell may
not always be Pareto-dominant. In fact, the work of Lim (2009) formally validates the popular be-
lief that overselling drives the “win-win” scenario: the valuation of late-arrivals is sufficiently high
making it feasible for firms to extract the reselling premium after compensating bumped consumers.
However, the key assumption that drive these results is that demand from early arrivals exceeds
both firms’ capacities and thus void the market of any pricing competition or negative impact
of demand uncertainty. In reality, this may not always be the case, albeit consumers who arrive
early are commonly deemed to have a lower valuation than those who arrive late (Desiraju and
Shugan 1999). During the financial crisis in 2008, the overall reduction in travel demand resulted in
under-utilized capacities and forced major airlines to ground some of their flights (The China Post
2009)! When early period demand turns out to be stochastic, the deliberate intention of selling be-
yond its capacity may fail to happen, undermining the potential of this practice as a hedge against
consumers’ no-show. In a related work, Netessine and Shumsky (2005) considered the equilibrium
allocation of seat capacity between fare classes and booking limits when firms compete under the
same price points. Recently, Sierag et al (2015) propose a revenue management model that takes
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into account of cancellations and customer choice behaviour. Using models to calibrate the param-
eters, they design efficient heuristic solution methods to optimize revenue. Finally, Lan et al (2015)
investigate a single-leg airline revenue management problem where an airline uses limited demand
information and uncensored no-show information to develop booking control decisions, resulting in
the seminal work that of seat allocation and overbooking decisions with such hybrid information.
With genuine pricing competition introduced by demand uncertainty in practice, these works did
not address the value of overselling within the context of revenue management.
Our work examines joint capacity allocation and pricing strategies whose consumers are differ-
entiated by timing of their arrivals, i.e., early and late arriving consumers. Frequently touted as
the airline industry’s best practice, we further seek to understand the value (and role) of voluntary
bumping with two selling options for the firm; namely, the conventional selling strategy (CS) and
the overselling strategy (OS). We define a conventional selling strategy as one whereby goods
contracted to early consumers are not resold to late (albeit high valuation) consumers. This is
reflective of not bumping away consumers even if market condition is favorable for reselling, for
e.g., demand by late arriving consumers exceeds quantities available for sale during that period.
In contrast, we define overselling strategy as one whereby a firm bumps but compensates its early
consumers in the process of reselling all previously contracted units. Under revenue maximization,
we posit that the value of overselling could have been overstated in reality and is dependent on
market structure. Should the monopolist refrain from bumping away consumers in anticipation
of weak selling opportunity during the early period? In a similar vein, we provide answers that
should interest the majority of firms operating under intense competition: “Can an equilibrium
be sustained when one firm finds it profitable to refrain from overselling even when its competitor
oversells?” or “Can an equilibrium exist where none of the firms oversells?” More specifically, we
analyze the underlying forces driving the equilibrium selling strategies and consider the feasibility
of overselling as a best response for the firms operating in a duopoly regime.
Our research yields the following policy insights and implications. First, overselling remains
profitable for the monopolist whenever it is possible to obtain reselling premium, a principle that
continues to hold even when demand is uncertain in the early period. Second, we show it is not
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true that when both firms oversell, their actions necessarily constitutes an equilibrium. This is in
contrast with the results in Lim (2009) and thus, generality of previous findings do not extend in
a duopoly once early demand is limited. Our research debunks earlier works that found overselling
to be weakly dominant and further raises a word of caution against practitioners’ complacency in
regarding it as a foolproof hedging strategy. Third, and more importantly, our results show that
when early demand is limited, there exist multiple equilibria when allocating capacity and this leads
to the outcome whereby the same parameters on demand arrivals, firm capacities and consumer
valuations can result in different selling strategies at the equilibrium. In other words, in addition
to market conditions and firm characteristics, the co-ordination between firms at the inventory
allocation level also has a part to play in determining the selling strategies at the equilibrium.
The main contribution of our paper is two-fold. Firstly, this is the first paper that established
that once the assumption of an unlimited early demand ceases to hold, existing findings about over-
selling as a (weakly) dominant strategy may no longer hold. This is because overselling necessarily
means that the available capacity is magnified and thus intensifies the pricing competition between
the firms in both periods. Thus, this paper extends our understanding of the overselling policy
that is prevalent in practice, yet we have limited appreciation of the intricacies involved once early
demand is limited. In addition, we also illustrate that simply having a compensation level that is
less than the valuation of the late-arriving consumer is not sufficient to guarantee that overselling
is indeed a (weakly) dominant strategy, again, contrary to earlier findings. When early demand is
not high, pricing competition between the firms are intensified. In this case, the profit margin of
selling to a late-arriving consumer has to be much higher than the compensation needed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we present the stylized model. In §3, we
examine the case of the monopoly seller. In §4, we focus on duopoly. In particular, we analyze the
joint capacity allocation and pricing equilibrium strategies and finally, we derive the equilibrium
selling strategies for the firm. Some numerical examples are provided to illustrate our findings. We
conclude in §5.
5
2 The Model
In this section, we present a stylized model that examines the role of overselling in a two-period
competitive environment with demand uncertainty over both periods.5 Furthermore, as representa-
tive of industries where the overselling strategy is a common practice, our model examines goods
(we use the term goods to refer to both products and services) that exhibit the following char-
acteristics. First, the good is perishable and is considered to be of value only for a limited time
period. More specifically, we assume that the salvage value of the good is zero at the end of Period
2. Second, the good can be bought in advance either during Periods 1 or 2 but consumption takes
place only at the end of Period 2 just before the salvage value of the good diminishes to zero.
Third, the marginal cost of production of the good is negligible as long as it is within the capacity,
which is fixed and cannot be adjusted in the short term. Fourth, the good is non-transferable.
Examples include most goods in the travel industry, such as air tickets, hotel bookings as well as
medical appointments and the selling of media slots. However, our model does not include goods
such as concert tickets or World Cup tickets which are transferable and thus have the potential to
spin off secondary markets where speculators buy the good in anticipation of making a hefty profit
from reselling it (Su 2009, Lim and Tang 2010). Goods of this nature are beyond the scope of this
paper. Throughout, we will assume that there is no possibility of no show. However, it will become
apparent that the essence of our results remain unchanged even if we relax this assumption.
Specification of the Game: We consider a model whereby early consumers with valuation v1 arrive
in Period 1 while late consumers with valuation v2 arrive in Period 2 and v2 > v1
6. It is widely
accepted that late arriving consumers are generally business travellers with corporate accounts
and thus have a higher valuation than the early consumers (see Desiraju and Shugan 1999). For
simplicity, we assume that the consumers have the same valuation for the goods provided by both
firms. To capture demand uncertainty, let Xt be the random variable for the number of consumers
who arrive in Period t for t = 1, 2. We assume that the timing of the consumer’s arrival is exogenous
5The monopoly model is a special case of the duopoly model and we omit its description here. The analysis
though, is given in §3.
6For ease of exposition, we have included a summary table of notations in the Appendix, see page 28.
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and early arriving consumers are not forward looking, i.e., they do not delay their purchase decisions
until Period 2. We further assume that early consumers who did not buy the good will leave forever
to seek alternatives. This is a reasonable assumption as holiday makers who do not manage to get an
air ticket to a destination will change to another destination. An alternative interpretation is that
early consumers who do not manage to buy in the early period but choose to return in Period 2 are
considered as late consumers and the persistence on their part is reflected by a higher valuation in
the late period.7 Furthermore, let us denote Ni to be the capacity for Firm i where price is set based
on its respective allocation strategy. In general, advance disclosure on the available number of units
for sale before firms set their respective prices is a reasonable assumption since there are various
websites that provide such information at any point in time 8. The interplay between capacity and
price can be summarized as follows. We assume that consumers are extremely price-sensitive and
will purchase from the firm that offers the lowest price. These consumers switch whenever (1) there
exists some competitor that is able to offer a lower price and (2) capacity offered by the lowest
price firm has been exhausted.
Sequence of Event: Our multiple-period dynamic game with observed actions can be specified as
follows. To focus on the impact of selling strategies on pricing and capacity allocation, we simplify
our analysis by allowing NA = NB = N to be the common capacity for both firms.
Period 0. We denote the action space of Firm i to be {CS,OS}. Firms A and B simultaneously
decide on their selling strategies λA, λB (λi ∈ {CS,OS}, i = A,B). As such, the set of pure strategy
profiles S = {(λA, λB)} consists of four possibilities: (CS,CS), (CS,OS), (OS,CS) and (OS,OS).
Subsequently, Firms A and B simultaneously determine the number of units kA(λA, λB), kB(λA, λB)
to allocate for sale in Period 1 while the remaining (N − kA(λA, λB)), (N − kB(λA, λB)) units will
be reserved for sale in Period 2.
Period 1. Firms A and B simultaneously set prices pA,1(λA, λB), pB,1(λA, λB) to maximize their
revenue after observing selling strategies λA, λB and capacity allocations kA(λA, λB), kB(λA, λB).
7This assumption is consistent with Biyalogorsky et al. (1999) and Lim (2009). In addition, when v2 is sufficiently
larger than v1, the price in Period 2 is higher than that in Period 1 so there is no incentive for early consumers to
delay their purchase till Period 2.
8For e.g., http://www.expertflyer.com and http://www.seatcounter.com
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During this period, X1 early consumers arrive and make their purchase decisions after observing
prices set by the firms. In general, the consumer purchases from Firm i in Period t if and only if (1)
there is available capacity, and (2) pi,t(λA, λB) = min(pA,t(λA, λB), pB,t(λA, λB)) ≤ vt. If there is
insufficient capacity to support consumer demand, then consumers will switch and purchase from
its competitor, otherwise the consumer leaves the market.9 To determine actions in the last period,
it is necessary to see how early demand for Firm i gets triggered by allocation and pricing decisions:
Di,1 =

min(X1, ki), if pi,1 < pj,1,
min((X1 − kj)+, ki), if pi,1 > pj,1.
j 6= i. Firms A and B earn Period 1 profits pA,1DA,1 and pB,1DB,1, respectively. We note that DA,1
and DB,1 are dependent on kA, kB, pA,1, pB,1 but independent of chosen selling strategies λA, λB.
As a result of the pricing competition introduced, the available selling capacities for the last period
becomes cA = N −DA,1 and cB = N −DB,1.
Period 2. Firms A and B simultaneously set prices pA,2(λA, λB), pB,2(λA, λB) to maximize their
revenue after observing selling strategies λA, λB, capacity allocations kA(λA, λB), kB(λA, λB) and
available selling capacities cA, cB. Subsequently, X2 consumers arrive and make their purchase
decisions upon observing the prices in that period. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events.
To this end, we note that the choice of selling strategy at the start of this game has cascading
implications on available selling capacities in Period 2. If Firm i chooses conventional selling, the
available selling capacity comes from the reserved N − ki(λi, λj) units plus unsold units that were
meant to target early arriving consumers.10 This is driven by stochastic early arrivals where that
Firm i may not necessarily exhaust all the allocated ki(λi, λj) units in Period 1 and those unsold
units are naturally available for sale in Period 2. If Firm i chooses overselling, the available selling
9We assume that if demand is higher than the available supply, the goods are randomly assigned to the consumers.
Likewise, if both firms have the same price, demand is uniformly assigned to the firms.
10ki(CS,CS) is equivalent to the booking limit Bi defined in Netessine and Shumsky (2005). However, our
framework includes pricing competition between the firms. More specifically, the demand in Period 1 defined as
X1 in our model is equals to the demand DLi + DLj in Netessine and Shumsky (2005). Upon announcement of
the prices pi,1(CS,CS), pj,1(CS,CS) by the firms, if pi,1(CS,CS) < pj,1(CS,CS), DLi = min(ki(CS,CS), X1),
DLj = X1 −DLi.
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capacities in Period 2 includes an additional reselling opportunity that arises from the units already
sold in Period 1. However, the firm is obligated to provide a compensation of τ (> pi,1) to the
early consumer.11 It is thus reasonable to assume that τ < v2, for otherwise, there is no incentive
for the firms to resell units that are already sold in Period 1. Finally, it is easy to see that Firm i
can only resell up to the number of units sold in Period 1 that is bounded by ki(λi, λj).
12
 
 
 
 
 
Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
(1) Firms simultaneously decide on 
selling strategies A, B. 
(2) Firms simultaneously decide on 
allocations kA, kB. 
(1) Firms simultaneously decide on 
prices pA,1, pB,1. 
(2) Early consumers arrive and make 
purchase decisions. 
(1) Firms simultaneously decide on
prices pA,2, pB,2. 
(2) Late consumers arrive and make 
purchase decisions. 
Figure 1: Sequence of Events 
3 The Monopoly Model
Let us without loss of generality assume that only Firm i exists in the market. Our goal is to
ascertain if the monopolist will be better off adopting the overselling strategy when demand arrivals
in both periods are uncertain. We write the payoff function under the given selling strategy (λi) and
allocated capacity (ki). The absence of competition (i.e., p−i,t = k−i = 0) implies that for Firm i,
the early demand and the observed available selling capacity trivially reduces to Di,1 = min(X1, ki)
11We assume that τ is exogenous so that we can focus on the selling strategies of the firms and need
not take into consideration the strategic role of τ . In practice, there is some generally accepted compensa-
tion. For example, the U.S. Department of Transport has some general guidelines on the compensation (see
http://airconsumer.dot.gov/publications/flyrights.htm#overbooking). Furthermore, consumers are not known to
take τ into consideration when making their purchase decisions. In the model of Netessine and Shumsky (2005),
there is no possibility of bumping, voluntary or otherwise, thus no consideration of the overselling strategy.
12In our framework, we do not consider the potential loss of customer goodwill from reselling. However, this
assumption does not affect the essence of our results.
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and ci = N −min(X1, ki), respectively.13 Given that pi,t is the price set prior to the realization of
Xi, the payoff for the monopolist can be written as:
14
ΠCSi (ki) = max
pi,t≤vt
pi,1E[N − ci] + pi,2E[min(ci, X2)], (1)
ΠOSi (ki) = max
pi,t≤vt
pi,1E[N − ci] + pi,2E[min(ci, X2)] +
(pi,2 − τ)E[min([X2 − ci]+, N − ci)]. (2)
As in the case of all monopolies, Firm i sets price pt to be the consumers valuation vt in Period t,
t = 1, 2. We can see from the equations above that the expected payoff for the firm when it adopts
the overselling strategy is simply what it gets by adopting the conventional selling strategy plus the
expected payoff it can achieve by reselling, which is given as the last term in (2). One immediate
consequence is that if the number of units allocated to Period 1, as denoted by ki here, is the same
under both selling strategies, then clearly, adopting the overselling strategy is no less profitable for
the monopoly firm.
3.1 Optimal Allocation Rule and Selling Strategy
To understand the impact of selling strategies for the monopolist Firm i, we first examine the
optimal allocation rule, i.e., the optimum number of units ki to allocate to Period 1, and thus,
the remaining units (N − ki) for Period 2. If we use k∗λi to denote the optimum number of units
allocated for Period 1 when the firm adopts the selling strategy λi (λi ∈ {CS,OS}). Then it must
be necessary that k∗CS , k
∗
OS(≤ N) are the largest integer such that ΠCS(k∗CS)− ΠCS(k∗CS − 1) > 0
and ΠOS(k∗OS)−ΠOS(k∗OS − 1) > 0, which simplify to
v1 > v2P (X2 ≥ N − k∗CS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗CS), (3)
v1 > τP (X2 ≥ N − k∗OS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗OS). (4)
Conventional Selling. The allocation rule spells out the tradeoff in allocating the unit between
Period 1 and reserving it for Period 2. When the k∗CS−th unit can be sold with positive probability
13Since there is only a monopoly firm in this section, we omit the subscript for the firm.
14The selling strategy adopted by the firm is denoted by the superscripts in the expected profit function.
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in Period 1, the value of not reserving it for deferred selling can be understood by rewriting (3):
v1P (X2 < N − k∗CS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗CS) > (v2 − v1)P (X2 ≥ N − k∗CS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗CS).
Given that P (X1 ≥ k∗CS) > 0, there is no value in reserving the k∗CS−th unit when the payoff v1
obtained from locking in the early selling opportunity is greater than the premium obtained from
deferred selling, subjected to the firm’s ability to sell it.
Overselling. The extent of overselling characterized by the number of early consumers to bump
in favour of reselling premium presents similar tradeoff. To understand the value of reselling the
k∗OS−th unit, we rewrite (4):
v1P (X2 < N − k∗OS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗OS) > (τ − v1)P (X2 ≥ N − k∗OS + 1|X1 ≥ k∗OS).
In a similar vein, the value of overselling the k∗OS−th unit is undermined when the payoff obtained
from locking in early sales opportunity exceeds the reselling premium τ − v1 captured in Period
2. We argue that the monopolist that engages in overselling is relatively more risk-averse. First, a
unit can always be resold in Period 2 as long as the demand arrival in Period 2 warrants it under
the overselling strategy. Second, the opportunity cost of forgoing the deferred selling payoff v2 (by
adopting CS) is higher than the cost of attempt in enabling the resell opportunity τ (by adopting
OS with reselling premium v2 − τ). As v2 > τ implies that ΠOS(k∗CS) > ΠOS(k∗CS − 1), we have
k∗CS ≤ k∗OS since by definition of k∗OS . Furthermore, we note that since ΠCS(k∗CS) ≤ ΠOS(k∗CS) ≤
ΠOS(k∗OS), a monopoly firm is always better off overselling. Therefore, we have the following result.
Theorem 1 The number of units that a monopoly firm allocates for Period 1 when it adopts
the overselling strategy is no less than the number of units it allocates for Period 1 if it adopts
the conventional selling strategy, i.e., k∗OS ≥ k∗CS if the arrivals X1, X2 are independent. The
monopolist always optimally oversells whenever v2 > τ .
When a firm operates in a monopoly market, it is able to fix the price at the consumer’s valuation
in each period, doing away with any price competition. Hence, it is not surprising that a monopoly
firm is always better off overselling. More importantly, the result holds under general demand
arrivals X1, X2, requiring only that the valuation of late-arriving consumers exceeds the sum of
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the refund and compensation for reselling. However, in the presence of competition in a duopoly,
price competition between the firms makes the tradeoff between allocating a unit for Period 1 and
reserving it for Period 2 more complex and less straightforward, particularly so when the demand
arrival in Period 1 is also stochastic and not sufficiently high to avoid pricing competition. In the
following section, we focus on the duopoly market and determine the optimum allocation rule and
the selling strategies at the equilibrium.
4 The Duopoly Model
We use subgame perfection as our solution concept and apply backward induction to solve for the
equilibrium. We will first consider the pricing strategies and optimum capacity allocation rules
in each of the three subgames, namely when both firms adopt the conventional selling strategy
((λA, λB) = (CS,CS)), when both firms adopt the overselling strategy ((λA, λB) = (OS,OS)),
and when only one firm, say Firm i, adopts the conventional selling strategy while Firm j adopts
the overselling strategy ((λi, λj) = (CS,OS)), i, j = A,B, i 6= j. Unless there is a possibility of
confusion, we will omit the term (λA, λB) in our notations in the following subsection.
4.1 Period 2 Pricing Equilibrium
Given selling strategies λA, λB and remaining capacities cA, cB, Firms A and B compete on prices in
Period 2. As in Narasimhan (1988), we will informally argue that the equilibrium pricing strategy
in Period 2 must necessarily be a mixed strategy (the formal proof is given in the appendix).15 Since
our model assumes that the consumer’s valuation for the firms’ goods are identical, consumers buy
from the firm with the lower price. This purchasing behavior of the consumers results in intense
price competition for the firms, with each of them trying to undercut the other firm, until the point
where the price is at zero, at which point, a firm is better off increasing its price to the valuation
v2 for otherwise, the expected profit is zero anyway. This is because the uncertainty in demand
arrival implies that a small reduction in price can trigger a significant increase in sales volume
while compromising only a minute profit margin as long as capacity is sufficiently large relative to
15The set of mixed strategies includes the pure strategies that are degenerate mixed strategies.
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demand. In response to this, the competing firm will be better off setting a price of (v2−), where 
is a small positive number. Again, this will trigger another round of price cuts. For i ∈ {A,B}, let
us denote pi,2 and p−i,2 to be the prices chosen by Firm i and its competitor, respectively. Given
the chosen selling strategies λi and realized remaining capacity ci, the payoff for Firm i during
Period 2 as a result of its undercutting effort can be derived as follows.
Firm Undercuts. Suppose pi,2 < p−i,2, the payoff for Firm i can be written as
Πi,2(pi,2, p−i,2, ci, c−i, λi, λ−i) = pi,2φˆi + (pi,2 − τ)ρˆi,
where φˆi = E[min(X2, ci)] and
ρˆi =
 0, if λi = CS;E[min((X2 − ci)+, N − ci)], if λi = OS.
When Firm i undercuts its competitor, the pricing game results in its payoff Πi,2(pi,2, p−i,2, ci, c−i, λi, λ−i)
being independent of its competitor’s selling strategy. The definition of ρˆi implies that the value of
overselling comes from late arrivals X2 exceeding the available selling capacity ci during this period
and is constrained by the limited available opportunity N − ci for overselling.
Firm Does Not Undercut. Suppose we have pi,2 > p−i,2, the payoff for Firm i becomes
Πi,2(pi,2, p−i,2, ci, c−i, λi, λ−i) = pi,2φi + (pi,2 − τ)ρi, where
φi =
 E[min((X2 − c−i)+, ci)], if λ−i = CS;E[min((X2 −N)+, ci)], if λ−i = OS.
ρi =

0, if λi = CS;
E[min((X2 − c−i − ci)+, N − ci)], if λi = OS, λ−i = CS;
E[min((X2 −N − ci)+, N − ci)], if λi = OS, λ−i = OS.
Without engaging in price undercutting, Firm i’s payoff now become dependent upon the selling
strategy of its competitor. In this case, the demand for Firm i are primarily driven by late consumers
(not supported by its competitor due to finite capacity ) and ρi implies that overselling loses its
shine whenever the number of firms adopting OS increases. Observe that φˆi ≥ φi and ρˆi ≥ ρi
for i ∈ {A,B}. Moreover, unless λ−i = CS and c−i = 0, φˆi > φi. Similarly, unless λi = CS, or
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λi = OS, λ−i = CS and c−i = 0, ρˆi > ρi. The following result is critical to establishing the pricing
strategy in Period 2.
Lemma 1 If Firm i adopts selling strategy λi, then it is able to sell more units if it undercuts the
price set by its competitor.
Essentially, Lemma 1 says that price undercutting as a tool is effective in driving additional sales
irregardless of selling strategy, except for trivial cases where there is no price competition. As a
result, the equilibrium pricing strategy in Period 2 must necessarily be a mixed strategy for each
firm. To present the Period 2 pricing equilibrium result, we define for each i ∈ {A,B},
li,2 =
v2(φi + ρi) + τ(ρˆi − ρi)
φˆi + ρˆi
, i∗2 = arg max
i∈{A,B}
{li,2}, l2 = max
i∈{A,B}
{li,2}. (5)
Theorem 2 Suppose the selling strategies are (λA, λB) and the remaining capacities are cA and
cB. The second period Nash equilibrium pricing strategy is a mixed pricing strategy characterized by
σi∗2(y), the probability that Firm i
∗
2 chooses pi∗2,2 to be less than or equal to y ∈ [l2, v2], and σ−i∗2(y),
the probability that Firm −i∗2 chooses p−i∗2,2 to be less than or equal to y ∈ [l2, v2). The equilibrium
profits in Period 2 are given by Π∗A,2(cA, cB, λA, λB) = l2φˆA+(l2−τ)ρˆA and Π∗B,2(cA, cB, λA, λB) =
l2φˆB + (l2 − τ)ρˆB, where φˆi, ρˆi, l2.
4.2 Period 1 Pricing Equilibrium
We can now analyze the pricing game in Period 1 taking into consideration expected future equi-
librium payoffs in Period 2 obtained in the previous section. Given selling strategies (λA, λB) and
Period 1 capacity allocations (kA, kB), firms play a pricing game by choosing prices (pA,1, pB,1)
with the expected profits
Πi,1(pi,1, p−i,1, λA, λB) =

pi,1ηˆi + Zˆi, if pi,1 < p−i,1,
pi,1ηi + Zi, if pi,1 > p−i,1,
(6)
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where
ZˆA = E[Π
∗
A,2(N −min(X1, kA), N −min((X1 − kA)+, kB), λA, λB)], (7)
ZA = E[Π
∗
A,2(N −min((X1 − kB)+, kA), N −min(X1, kB), λA, λB)], (8)
ZˆB = E[Π
∗
B,2(N −min((X1 − kB)+, kA), N −min(X1, kB), λA, λB)], (9)
ZB = E[Π
∗
B,2(N −min(X1, kA), N −min((X1 − kA)+, kB), λA, λB)], (10)
are functions of kA, kB, λA and λB, whereas
ηˆi = E[min(X1, ki)], ηi = E[min((X1 − k−i)+, ki)]. (11)
for each i ∈ {A,B}, are functions of kA and kB but independent of λA and λB. During Period 1,
the undercutting effort continues to help the firm capture larger market share plus the equilibrium
payoff generated during the subsequent selling period. To present the Period 1 pricing equilibrium
result, we define for each i ∈ {A,B},
li,1 =
v1ηi + Zi − Zˆi
ηˆi
, i∗1 = arg max
i∈{A,B}
{li,1}, l1 = max
i∈{A,B}
{li,1}. (12)
Theorem 3 Suppose the selling strategies are (λA, λB) and capacity allocations are kA and kB.
The first-period equilibrium pricing strategy is a mixed pricing strategy characterized by ωi∗2(y),
the probability that Firm i∗1 chooses pi∗1,1 to be less than or equal to y ∈ [l1, v1], and ω−i∗1(y), the
probability that Firm −i∗1 chooses p−i∗1,1 to be less than or equal to y ∈ [l1, v1). The equilibrium
payoffs are given by Π∗A,1(kA, kB, λA, λB) = l1ηˆA+ ZˆA and Π
∗
B,1(kA, kB, λA, λB) = l1ηˆB+ ZˆB, where
ZˆA, ZˆB, ηˆi, l1 are given in (7) and (9), (11), (12).
4.3 Capacity Allocation Rule and Selling Strategies at Equilibrium: A Numer-
ical Illustration
Here, we will first examine the capacity allocations kA, kB before we determine the selling strategies
at equilibrium. In the spirit of backward induction, we can deduce the allocations kA, kB by
considering the expected profits of the firms as given in Theorems 2 and 3. The key idea is to
compare the expected profits of Firm i when allocating the kth unit for Period 1 or reserving it for
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Period 2 for each of the subgame (λA, λB) when Firm j allocates kj in Period 1. Put differently,
by comparing the tradeoffs that Firm i faces with the allocation of the kth unit, one would be
able to deduce if it is more profitable for the firm to reserve it for Period 2 or to put it up for
sale in Period 1. In the appendix, we present the technical result for the special case of symmetric
equilibrium. For the general case, the analysis proves unwieldy to be further simplified. As such,
we proceed with two numerical examples here to illustrate the underlying intuitions regarding the
firms’ allocation strategies and selling strategies at equilibrium 16.
Example 1 (Demand Low Relative to Capacity). Consider two symmetric firms such
that v1 = 1, v2 = 2, τ = 1.1 and N = 2. Let X1, X2 be independent and Xt ∼ U [0, 2] for t = 1, 2. In
Tables 1, 2 and 3, we show the allocation game that is faced by the firms in the subgames (CS,CS),
(OS,OS) and (CS,OS), respectively. We first note that in this example, each firm has sufficient
capacity (N = 2) to meet the demand (≤ 2) in each period. This suggests that Example 1 deals
with the context where the total demand is relatively low with respect to the capacity available in
the market.
When both firms adopt the conventional selling strategy, we can see from Table 1 that the
allocation at equilibrium are (kA, kB) = (2, 1) or (1, 2).
17 That is, one firm allocates its entire
capacity to Period 1 (with some chance that not all units can indeed be sold) while the other firm
allocates one unit to Period 1 and the remaining unit to Period 2. In this case, owing to both firms
adopting the conventional selling strategy, the firm that “focuses” on the market in Period 1 (ki = 2)
does not get any chance to sell any units in Period 2 once its capacity is sold entirely in Period 1,
unlike Firm j with kj = 1. Hence, we observe that Firm i has a lower expected profit than Firm
j (1.67 < 1.85). When both firms adopt the overselling strategy, the relatively low demand with
respect to the firms’ capacities results in the firms’ expected profits being strictly lower than when
both firms adopt the conventional selling strategy for all allocations ki, kj when max(ki, kj) > 0.
At the equilibrium, (kA, kB) = (2, 0) or (0, 2), i.e., one firm again “focuses” on Period 1 while the
other on Period 2. As both firms adopt the overselling strategy, the firm focusing on Period 1 has
16These two numerical examples are presented as they are representative of a range of numerical examples that we
have examined.
17We focus only on pure-strategy equilibrium at the allocation level.
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kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.44,0.44) (1.33,1.47) (1.78,1.4)
1 (1.47,1.33) (1.44,1.44) (1.85,1.67)
2 (1.4,1.78) (1.67,1.85) (1.78,1.78)
Table 1: Allocation Game for (CS,CS) in Example 1
kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.44,0.44) (0.93,1.11) (1.18,1.32)
1 (1.11,0.93) (0.78,0.78) (0.99,0.78)
2 (1.32,1.18) (0.78,0.99) (0.44,0.44)
Table 2: Allocation Game for (OS,OS) in Example 1
the advantage of reselling (in Period 2) some of its capacity already sold in Period 1, much as the
likelihood is low due to the tight demand. Nonetheless, this results in the firm having a higher
expected profit than the firm focusing on Period 2 (1.32 > 1.18). Finally, it is worthwhile to note
that when only one firm (Firm i) oversells, each firm enjoys a strictly higher expected profit than
when both oversell as long as ki is strictly positive. Furthermore, the allocation at the equilibrium
in the subgame (CS,OS) is ki = kj = 2. This suggests that with Firm i adopting the conventional
selling strategy, the pricing competition in Period 2 is limited, thereby resulting in higher expected
profits for both firms. This allocation game provides some hints into why the overselling strategy
may not be a weakly dominant strategy in the face of limited demand in Period 1.
In the following, we derive the selling strategies at equilibrium. Suppose Firm i adopts the
conventional selling strategy. If Firm j responds with a conventional selling strategy, its expected
profit is either 1.67 or 1.85. If it responds with an overselling strategy instead, its expected profit is
2.22 (> 1.85 > 1.67) (Table 3). Thus, the best response for Firm j here is to oversell. On the other
hand, if Firm i adopts the overselling strategy, Firm j’s expected profit is 1.78 from a conventional
selling strategy (Table 3) but 1.18 or 1.32 from an overselling strategy (Table 2). Therefore, the best
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kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.44,0.44) (0.93,1.11) (1.18,1.32)
1 (1.47,1.33) (1.53,1.54) (1.52,1.54)
2 (1.4,1.78) (1.67,2.01) (1.78,2.22)
Table 3: Allocation Game for (CS,OS) in Example 1
λA\λB CS OS
CS (1.85,1.67) (1.78,2.22)
OS (2.22,1.78) (1.18,1.32)
Table 4: Selling Strategy Game in Example 1
response to an overselling competitor is to adopt the conventional selling strategy. Summarizing,
the unique equilibrium at the selling strategy level is for only one firm to oversell. Table 4 shows an
instance of the game at the selling strategy level when specific equilibria are chosen at the allocation
level for the various subgames.18
This example clearly illustrates that overselling may not be (weakly) dominant anymore once
the demand in Period 1 is not sufficiently large to accommodate the total capacity of the firms. The
intuition is as follows. When the early demand is not sufficiently large to meet the total capacity
available, the tradeoffs between allocating units between Periods 1 and 2 become more complex.
In particular, the above example shows that when one firm oversells, the best response is actually
18Note that owing to the existence of multiple equilibria at the allocation level, there exist different games at the
selling strategy level, depending on the choice of the allocation equilibrium. As in games where there exist multiple
equilibria, we note that we may need to apply some equilibrium refinement notions to address the question of which
equilibrium will actually realize. However, our context is really a co-ordination game where upon each firm choosing
the conventional selling strategy, the allocation equilibrium is either (3, 1) or (1, 3). Thus, as in the spirit of co-
ordination games with a repeated flavor, we propose that if the game is repeated over time, which it is in reality, then
firms may need to alternate over their allocation strategies of 1 and 3 respectively. The fact that firms are in the
same game over time should provide incentives for each firm to abide by the co-ordination for fear of being ‘penalized’
using some trigger strategy or the tit-for-tat strategy.
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not to oversell. This is because by not overselling, pricing competition in Period 2 is muted and
as a result, the pricing competition (which does not exist if the early demand is large) in Period
1 is also muted as the opportunity to sell in Period 2 presents itself as a more attractive option
(than Period 1) for the overselling firm. As shown in Lim (2009), overselling naturally intensifies
the pricing competition in Period 2 so much so that it may lead to Pareto-dominated outcome, i.e.,
overselling is a weakly dominant strategy yet firms are worse off at the equilibrium by adopting
the weakly dominant strategy when the demand in Period 1 is high. Here, we show that when the
demand in Period 1 is not sufficiently high and thus is subjected to pricing competition between
the firms, any negative impact from the pricing competition in Period 2 spills over to Period 1. Put
differently, the negative impact on prices in both periods from overselling is magnified once Period
1 is not shielded from pricing competition. In the following, we consider an example that further
illustrates this observation when the demands in both periods are correlated.
Example 2 (Correlated Demands). Consider two symmetric firms such that v1 = 1, v2 =
2, τ ∈ {1.2, 1.4} and N = 2. Let X1, X2 be dependent with the following joint distribution:
P (X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = P (X1 = 1, X2 = 0) = P (X1 = 3, X2 = 2) = P (X1 = 3, X2 = 3) = P (X1 =
3, X2 = 4) = P (X1 = 5, X2 = 0) = 0.1, P (X1 = 3, X2 = 5) = P (X1 = 4, X2 = 1) = P (X1 =
4, X2 = 2) = P (X1 = 5, X2 = 1) = 0.05, P (X1 = 2, X2 = 0) = 0.2, and P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2) = 0,
otherwise.
First, a careful examination of the joint probability distribution reveals that there is a higher
probability that the demand in Period 1 is larger than that in Period 2. Secondly, we note that in
this example, the total capacity of the firms is 2N = 4. Yet the maximum demand in each period
Xt is 5. Thus, this example presents a scenario in which the potential demand in the market is
significantly higher than the total capacity. This thus provides a context for the overselling strategy
to be dominant. However, we shall see that this is not always the case. Tables 5, 6 and 7 show
the allocation game that is faced by the firms in the subgames (CS,CS), (OS,OS) and (CS,OS),
respectively when τ = 1.2.
Table 5 shows that when both firms adopt conventional selling, there exist three equilibria
at the allocation level. The expected profit outcome of (1.6, 1.6) where kA = kB = 1 is Pareto-
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kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.8,0.8) (1.3,1.57) (1.8,1.7)
1 (1.57,1.3) (1.6,1.6) (1.74,1.4)
2 (1.7,1.8) (1.4,1.74) (1.55,1.55)
Table 5: Allocation Game for (CS,CS) in Example 2 (τ ∈ [1, 2])
dominated by the other two equilibria in which one observes are instances where the firm ‘splits’
the market, with the firm selling in Period 2 obtaining a slightly higher expected profit. Since there
is no overselling and thus no compensation for reselling, the expected profits are independent of τ .
Suppose τ = 1.2. When both firms oversell, we find that one firm (say Firm i) allocates its entire
capacity to Period 1 while the other firm allocates one unit to Period 1 at the equilibrium owing to
the nature of the joint probability distribution that the demand in Period 1 is likely to be higher
than that in Period 2. Again, there are two equilibria at the allocation level and the firm that
allocates 2 units to Period 1 obtains a higher expected profit not just from the potentially higher
demand in Period 1 but also the opportunity to oversell later in Period 2. Finally, when only one
firm oversells, the allocations at equilibrium is (1, 2). The overselling firm is in a better position
to hedge the demand risk in Period 2 by allocating two units to Period 1, thereby increasing its
expected profit to 1.92 as compared to 1.61 for the firm which does not oversell. It is straightforward
to see that overselling is a dominant strategy for each firm. More specifically, given that Firm i
adopts conventional selling, Firm j obtains a profit of 1.7 or 1.8 by adopting the conventional
selling strategy but a higher expected profit of 1.92 by overselling. Similarly, if Firm i oversells, the
expected profit of Firm j is either 1.61 from conventional selling or at least 1.66 from overselling.
Table 8 shows a particular case of the game at the selling strategy level. Thus, we conclude that
when τ = 1.2, overselling is a dominant strategy. However, this conclusion no longer holds as τ ,
the compensation takes on a larger value.
Similar observations on the allocation level hold when τ = 1.4 as shown in Tables 9 and 10.
However, as a higher τ reduces the attractiveness of the overselling strategy, the overselling strategy
is no longer a dominant strategy. In fact, there does not necessarily exist any dominant strategy as
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kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.8,0.8) (1.1,1.52) (1.4,2.02)
1 (1.52,1.1) (1.42,1.42) (1.66,1.72)
2 (2.02,1.4) (1.72,1.66) (1.47,1.47)
Table 6: Allocation Game for (OS,OS) in Example 2 (τ = 1.2)
kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.8,0.8) (1.1,1.52) (1.4,2.02)
1 (1.57,1.3) (1.57,1.8) (1.61,1.92)
2 (1.7,1.8) (1.4,2.06) (1.55,2.27)
Table 7: Allocation Game for (CS,OS) in Example 2 (τ = 1.2)
λA\λB CS OS
CS (1.8,1.7) (1.61,1.92)
OS (1.92,1.61) (1.66,1.72)
Table 8: Selling Strategy Game in Example 2 (τ = 1.2)
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kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.8,0.8) (1.15,1.49) (1.5,1.94)
1 (1.49,1.15) (1.39,1.39) (1.681,1.64)
2 (1.94,1.5) (1.64,1.681) (1.44,1.44)
Table 9: Allocation Game for (OS,OS) in Example 2 (τ = 1.4)
kA\kB 0 1 2
0 (0.8,0.8) (1.15,1.49) (1.5,1.94)
1 (1.567,1.3) (1.583,1.75) (1.641,1.79)
2 (1.7,1.8) (1.4,1.981) (1.55,2.09)
Table 10: Allocation Game for (CS,OS) in Example 2 (τ = 1.4)
it depends on which allocation is chosen under the various subgames. Tables 11 and 12 show that
there exists an equilibrium where only one firm oversells or the equilibrium can even involve the
use of mixed strategies. It is straightforward to verify that (OS,OS) is no longer an equilibrium
here. More specifically, if Firm i adopts overselling, Firm j gets a payoff of 1.658 by adopting
conventional selling. Thus, it is a best response for Firm j to oversell if its payoff from doing so
is 1.69 instead of 1.6, that is, the allocation in the subgame (OS,OS) has to be ki = 2, kj = 1.
Bearing this in mind, the best response for Firm i as a result is no longer to oversell (whcih gives
a payoff of 1.6) since conventional selling gives a payoff of at least 1.7.
In summary, these examples suggest that the allocation rule is more complex once the demand in
λA\λB CS OS
CS (1.8,1.7) (1.641,1.79)
OS (1.79,1.641) (1.64,1.681)
Table 11: Selling Strategy Game in Example 2 (τ = 1.4), Asymmetric Equilibrium
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λA\λB CS OS
CS (1.8,1.7) (1.641,1.79)
OS (1.79,1.641) (1.681,1.64)
Table 12: Selling Strategy Game in Example 2 (τ = 1.4), Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Period 1 is no longer large. Clearly, when this allocation rule is taken into consideration to analyze
the selling strategies at the equilibrium, it renders the analysis even more complex. Following from
the examples above, it is clear that the overselling strategy loses its shine once the demand in
Period 1 is not sufficiently high to guarantee the sale of all available capacities. The main reason
is the early demand uncertainty leads to a spillover effect of pricing competition in Period 2 to
Period 1. This magnifies the negative impact of the overselling strategy so much so that it renders
it undesirable as part of an equilibrium.
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
Traditionally in the operations management literature, studies have focused on pricing and capacity
allocation strategies when there is demand uncertainty. In this paper, we extend studies in this
area to consider the impact of incorporating the overselling strategy when demand uncertainty
occurs over multiple periods. The overselling strategy is not uncommon, particularly in the service
industries where purchase and consumption times do not coincide. That is, goods (or services) may
be purchased earlier and consumption takes place only at a later time.
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we enrich the extant literature by focusing on the value
of overselling as market structure shifts between monopoly and duopoly. In absence of competition,
we strengthen the main result of Biyalogorsky et al (1999) by showing that overselling continues
to shine as the optimal selling strategy even when early arrival can be limited. Second, we show
that overselling by both firms as a (weakly) dominant strategy may fail to hold in a competitive
setting. The roadmap of our analysis is based on formalizing the equilibrium pricing strategies in
both periods. This leads to our critical finding where we show that stochastic early demand (that
are not sufficiently high to guarantee the sale of all units allocated to the early period) can result
in genuine pricing competition, causing overselling loses its shine as a weakly dominant strategy in
a duopoly regime. Third, whether the equilibrium sees any firm adopting the overselling strategy
depends not just on the market characteristics, as identified by the demand arrivals in the early and
late periods, the consumers’ valuations and firm characteristics such as the capacity, the capacity
allocation at the equilibrium are also important factors in determining the selling strategies at the
equilibrium. These observations are made through various numerical examples. In particular, we
show that when the early period is not immune to pricing competition, it will bear the impact of
pricing competition in the late period, thus excavating any negative effect owing to the overselling
strategy (Example 1). In addition, different choices of the capacity allocations at the equilibrium
can indeed lead to different selling strategies at the equilibrium all else being the same (see Example
2 in §3.3). Thus, our research offers a word of caution to guard against complacency in assuming
that overselling is always a weakly dominant strategy when a firm is operating as part of a duopoly.
To answer the questions raised in the opening paragraph, an equilibrium can indeed exist where
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one firm finds it profitable to refrain from overselling even when the competing firm oversells once
early demand is uncertain.
 
market 
 structureearly arrival 
 assumption
Figure 1: Market Structure and Impact on the Value of Overselling
Our research thus suggests that managers should examine not just the market structure and
firm characteristics when considering their pricing and selling strategies. More importantly, they
need to convey the value proposition to competing firms regarding the need, or rather, the merits
of co-ordinating at the capacity allocation level to lead to a more favorable win-win profit outcome.
As our analyses have shown, there often exist multiple equilibria both at the capacity allocation level
as well as the selling strategy level. More co-ordination can certainly facilitate the occurrence of an
equilibrium outcome. As can be seen, more airlines are already forming alliances and code-sharing
their flights. Such practice clearly helps to coordinate the number of units available for sale in
each time period. Our research suggests that perhaps more coordination and information sharing
can further benefit the firms in terms of achieving mutually favorable selling strategy equilibria.
In addition, other industries (such as the hotel industry) perhaps can also take a leaf from the
co-operative behavior between airlines to further enhance their profitability. Much as hotels offer
less identical products and services than airlines, perhaps specific alliances may still be possible
within hotels of similar offerings and close vicinities.
Clearly, there are limitations to our work. We have assumed in our model, that the arrival of
consumers is exogenous. In the face of more strategic consumers who make their purchase decisions
based not only on the current price, but also on the future anticipated price, future research may
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want to look into the possibility where consumers can choose their arrival time. Along the same
vein, consumers in each period in our model, are homogeneous. Future work may seek to examine
if the overselling strategy can maintain its shine should consumers in each period be heterogeneous.
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7 Appendix A
Table 13: Table of Notations
A,B firms in a duopoly
N capacity of Firm i, i = A,B
vt valuation of good for consumers who arrive in Period t, (t = 1, 2)
Xt random variable to denote the no. of consumers arriving in Period t, (t = 1, 2)
λi(λi = CS,OS) selling strategy of Firm i
ki(λi, λj) no. of units reserved for sale in Period 2 by Firm i
when the selling strategies are λi, λj
pi,t(λi, λj) price set by Firm i for Period t when the selling strategies are λi, λj
τ compensation to early consumer if good is resold in Period 2
Π
λi,λj
i expected profit for Firm i if selling strategies are λi, λj
Di,t demand of Firm i in Period t
Ci random variable to denote the beginning capacity of Firm i in Period 2
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7.1 Pricing Strategies at Equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose Firm A adopts a pure pricing strategy such that
pB,2 < pA,2 ≤ v2. Then, p∗A,2 = v2 as the market share remains unchanged but the profit margin is
higher. Given p∗A,2 = v2, Firm B’s best response is to undercut since the profit margin is greater,
i.e. p∗B,2 = v2 − . In response to p∗B,2 = v2 − , it is better off for Firm A to undercut so that
p∗A,2 = v2 − 2. Because φˆi > φi and ρˆi > ρi for i ∈ {A,B}, it is always beneficial (to gain market
share) for the firm to undercut each other until p∗A,2 = 0, in which case Firm B responds to this by
setting p∗B,2 = v2, leading to another round of price undercutting. Hence, any pricing strategy at
the equilibrium must necessarily be a mixed strategy.
Next, we characterize the mixed strategy at the Nash equilibrium. Suppose U∗i is the equilibrium
pricing strategy set for firm i, for i ∈ {A,B}. Similar to Narasimhan (1988), it can be shown that
the strategy sets can only be one of four continuous intervals, i.e. U∗i ∈ {(l, v2), [l, v2), (l, v2], [l, v2]}.
Suppose U∗A = [lA,2, v2]. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, firm A must be indifferent among
all prices in U∗A. Hence, we equate ΠA,2(lA,2, pB,2) = lA,2φˆA + (lA,2 − τ)ρˆA and ΠA,2(v2, pB,2) =
v2φA + (v2 − τ)ρA to obtain
lA,2 =
v2(φA + ρA) + τ(ρˆA − ρA)
φˆA + ρˆA
.
We can obtain lB,2 in a similar manner. However, l can only be either lA,2 or lB,2. By definition,
li∗2,2 > l−i∗2,2. Hence, firm −i∗2 has incentive to price at li∗2,2 instead of pricing at [l−i∗2,2, li∗2,2). This
allows firm −i∗2 to earn a profit greater than what it would at price v2. Hence, in equilibrium firm
−i∗2 cannot have a mass point at v2, i.e. U∗−i∗2 = [l2, v2). As in Narasimhan (1988), we also get
U∗i∗2 = [l2, v2]. Next, we derive the probability distribution functions σi∗2 and σ−i∗2 . Suppose firm i
∗
2
sets price y ∈ [l2, v2). Then, the profit should be equal to the profit obtained at v2.
v2φi∗2 + (v2 − τ)ρi∗2 = [yφˆi∗2 + (y − τ)ρˆi∗2 ][1− σ−i∗2(y)] + [yφi∗2 + (y − τ)ρi∗2 ]σ−i∗2(y).
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Similarly, suppose firm −i∗2 sets price y ∈ [l2, v2). Then, the profit should be equal to the profit
obtained at l2.
l2φ−i∗2 + (l2 − τ)ρ−i∗2 = [yφˆ−i∗2 + (y − τ)ρˆ−i∗2 ][1− σi∗2(y)] + [yφ−i∗2 + (y − τ)ρ−i∗2 ]σi∗2(y).
It follows that for y ∈ [l2, v2),
σ−i∗2(y) =
yφˆi∗2 + (y − τ)ρˆi∗2 − v2φi∗2 − (v2 − τ)ρi∗2
y(φˆi∗2 − φi∗2) + (y − τ)(ρˆi∗2 − ρi∗2)
(13)
σi∗2(y) =
(y − l2)(φˆ−i∗2 + ρˆ−i∗2)
y(φˆ−i∗2 − φ−i∗2) + (y − τ)(ρˆ−i∗2 − ρ−i∗2)
(14)
It can be verified that σi∗2(l2) = σ−i∗2(l2) = 0, σ−i∗2(v2) = 1, and
σi∗2(v2) =
(v2 − l2)(φˆ−i∗2 + ρˆ−i∗2)
v2(φˆ−i∗2 − φ−i∗2) + (v2 − τ)(ρˆ−i∗2 − ρ−i∗2)
< 1. (15)
Hence, σ−i∗2 has no mass point at v2 while σi∗2 has a mass point at v2 equal to 1− σi∗2(v2). Finally,
the equilibrium payoffs follow by definition.
Proof of Theorem 3. Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
7.2 Capacity Allocation Rule at Equilibrium
We first define κ, κ¯, κR as follows before we analyze each subgame respectively.
κ = inf{y ∈ N : P (X2 ≥ 2N − y) > v1
v2
}, (16)
κ¯ = inf{x ∈ N : P (X1 > x) = 0}, (17)
κR = inf{y ∈ N : P (X2 ≥ 2N − y) > v1
τ
} (18)
Note that κR ≥ κ.
Lemma 2 (Symmetric equilibrium). ((λA, λB) = (CS,CS)). Suppose both firms adopt the
conventional selling strategy. Then Firm i allocates kCS,CSi (= k) units for sale in Period 1, where
k is such that
v1 > v2P (X2 ≥ 2N − 2k + 1|X1 ≥ 2k),
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j 6= i, j = A,B. More specifically, when the arrivals X1 and X2 are independent, k = min(min(κ, κ¯)−
k,N).
Proof. Consider the subgame where both firms adopt the conventional selling strategy. Let
kCS,CSi = k
CS,CS
j = k denote the symmetric allocations for Firm i and Firm j at the equilibrium.
Given kCS,CSj , k
CS,CS
i must satisfy Π
CS,CS
i (k
CS,CS
i , k
CS,CS
j ) − ΠCS,CSi (kCS,CSi − 1, kCS,CSj ) > 0,
which simplifies to v1P (X1 ≥ kCS,CSi +kCS,CSj )−v2P (X1 ≥ kCS,CSi +kCS,CSj , X2 ≥ 2N− (kCS,CSi +
kCS,CSj ) + 1). If particular, if X1, X2 are independent, k
CS,CS
i = inf{x ≤ N : P (X2 ≥ 2N − (x +
kCS,CSj )) >
v1
v2
} ∧ [κ¯ − kCS,CSj ]+ = min(min(κ, κ¯), kCS,CSj , N). The second inequality holds when
P (X1 ≥ kCS,CSj + ki) > 0 and X1, X2 are independent.
Lemma 3 (Symmetric equilibrium). ((λA, λB) = (OS,OS)). Suppose both firms adopt the
overselling strategy. Then Firm i allocates kOS,OSi (= k) units for sale in Period 1, where k is such
that
v1 > (1 + α)v1P (X2 ≥ 2N − k + 1|X1 ≥ 2k),
j 6= i, j = A,B. More specifically, when the arrivals X1 and X2 are independent, k = min(κR, [κ¯−
k]+, N).
Proof. Consider the subgame where both firms adopt the overselling strategy. Let kOS,OSi =
kOS,OSj = k denote the symmetric allocations for Firm i and Firm j at the equilibrium. Given
kOS,OSj , k
OS,OS
i must satisfy Π
OS,OS
i (k
OS,OS
i , k
OS,OS
j ) − ΠOS,OSi (kOS,OSi − 1, kOS,OSj ) > 0, which
simplifies to v1P (X1 ≥ kOS,OSi +kOS,OSj )−(1+α)v1P (X1 ≥ kOS,OSi +kOS,OSj , X2 ≥ 2N−kOS,OSi +1).
If particular, if X1, X2 are independent, k
OS,OS
i = inf{x ≤ N : P (X2 ≥ 2N −X) > 11+α} ∧ [κ¯ −
kOS,OSj ]
+ = min(κR, [κ¯−kOS,OSj ]+, N). The second inequaltiiy holds when P (X1 ≥ kOS,OSj +ki) > 0
and X1, X2 are independent.
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